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INTERMODAL COMPETITION WITH HIGH SPEED
RAIL- A GAME THEORY APPROACH
Oliver Feng-Yeu Shyr* and Meng-Fu Hung**
Key words: high speed rail, coalition, Nash equilibrium, cooperative game.

ABSTRACT
It was estimated that approximately 50% of the air trips,
20% of rail trips, and 15% of freeway bus trips in Taiwan’s
western corridor would be replaced by Taiwan High Speed
Rail (THSR) [5]. If the carriers of these trips are to compete
with THSR, reducing flight frequency and allying airlines
might be the most effective approaches. In this paper we
calibrate the payoff functions of various modes with stated
preference (SP) and revealed preference (RP) data and solve
the new Nash Equilibrium by maximizing payoff functions
with respect to fare rates and flight frequency after the operation of THSR. In the case study, we predict that allied airlines
flying between Taipei and Kaohsiung would be difficult to
remain profitable during the first quarter of THSR’s operations,
but the market share and the daily flight frequency will reduce
by more than 50%.

I. BACKGROUND
After the Inauguration on January 5, 2007, Taiwan High
Speed Rail (THSR) began to operate between Banciao Station
of Taipei and Kaohsiung at the promotion rate 730 New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) with 17 daily trains each bound. During the
three-week promotion period, competitors such as domestic
airlines, freeway buses, and Taiwan Railway (TR) were forced
to reduce either their fare rates or frequency to prevent further
deterioration of profitability. For example, some domestic
airlines offered 32% off discount for weekend travelers to
compete with THSR. Starting from March 31, THSR provides
23 daily trains between Taipei and Kaohsiung at full rate 1490
NTD. Up to mid-March, Taiwan’s Council for Economic
Planning and Development estimated that the average daily
passengers of THSR were 33,161. Meanwhile, airlines flying
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the same domestic routes dropped more than 10% of their load
factors. For domestic airlines to survive, a unified alliance is
needed to rescheduling the daily flight frequency and allocating the profits among them. Similarly, Button [2] suggested that appropriate policy reactions, e.g., removal of some
restrictions on airline merging and coalitions, might allow a
more sustainable market structure.
In fact, Taiwan’s Fair Trade Commission has approved all
four airlines flying between Taipei and Kaohsiung to form
coalition at the end of the second quarter in 2007 with one
restriction, i.e., the daily flights provided by these airlines
should not be reduced from the date of their application. As
THSR schedules to increase their service frequency in the
third and the fourth quarters consecutively, domestic airline
found it very difficult to comply with the restrictions. As a
result, the coalition fell apart in the fourth quarter and one of
the airlines, i.e., Far Eastern Air Transport, had terminated
their service in the second quarter of 2008. The development
is also consistent with the study by Shyr and Kuo [10] who
pointed out that a successful airline coalition would rely on
both profitability and financial stability.
A newly published report by Taiwan’s Ministry of Transportation and Communications [6] shows the before-and-after
comparison of modal splits on Taiwan’s western corridor
regarding THSR’s operations. Based on a survey sample of
1713 passengers, the modal splits before THSR’s operations
are 29.4% by TR, 29.1% by automobiles, 18.6% by freeway
buses, 13.5% by air, 5.2% by tour buses, 0.4% by taxi, 0.2 %
by the others, and 3.6% not reporting any previous modes of
transport – these respondents possibly represent new derived
demand. After the operation of THSR, the modal splits become 41.9% by THSR, 14.2% by TR, 21.4% by automobiles,
12.8% by freeway buses, 3.2% by air, 4.2% by tour buses,
0.2% by taxi, and 2.1% by the others. The report further points
out that 67.2% of 231 previous air passengers would change
their mode of travel to THSR while only 20.1% of them remain unchanged. On the other hand, the splits of the
changed/unchanged ratios are 47.6% and 38.8% for 503 previous TR travelers, and 32.5% and 55.2% for 319 previous
freeway bus travelers. In addition, 155 previous air travelers
who change their mode of transport to THSR are asked
whether they would switch back to air travel if airlines offer
cheaper promotion airfares. Only 41.8% of them reply yes,
17.3% of them are uncertain, and 40.9% of them say no. All in
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all, major modes of intercity transport are significantly affected by THSR. But air travel market suffers the most severe
damage resulting from THSR’s operations. Up to this date,
only a handful of weekly flights remain in service on the
western corridor. The reasons for airline’s dropout of the
market are threefold: 1) airlines are forced to cut down most of
their services due to soaring gasoline prices in the first half of
2008; 2) THSR continues to increase their frequency while
promoting their lower fare rates; and most importantly, 3)
airline’s chances to reopen the market have been diminished in
the short run due to the worldwide economical recession occurred in the second half of 2008.
It is arguable to state that most of the modes of intercity
transport, especially airlines, do not act swiftly enough to cope
with the change of the market. It is however never too late to
set up proper strategies to compete with THSR. Moreover, we
should always bear in mind that regulation on price and service frequency of public transportation systems as imposed by
the authority is used to be set according to the operational
costs under market equilibrium. But the introduction of
high speed rail has broken the equilibrium and the operating
costs calculated based on historical load factors and existing
schedule could no longer be trustworthy under various competition scenarios. And that is why we propose new price
regulations under new service frequency based on social
welfare which could be justified by the greater good of our
society. In this paper we focus on three issues regarding
strategic planning: what are the new rules of the market? In
other words, what are the new price regulations and new service frequency under the impacts of THSR on all competing
modes? What should the competing modes, especially airlines
and freeway buses, react with coalition strategies regarding
pricing and operation planning? And how to allocate profits
among allied members? To begin with our analysis, we first
formulate the modal choice model and the payoff functions
for all competing modes. Next, we solve Nash equilibrium
among competing modes and use cooperative games methods
to allocate profits among airlines. A case study based on data
collected from the biggest domestic air travel OD market, i.e.,
Taipei-Kaohsiung, is given to assess the consequences after
the operation of THSR. In the case study, we assume that
THSR is the leader of the market - according to the new
market shares published by the authority; while airlines and
freeway buses are the followers of the market. We do not
propose scheduling strategies for railway and assume its service frequency remains unchanged because we do not have
any information regarding its operating costs and we also
acknowledge that railway scheduling is set by Taiwan Railway
Administration (TRA), whose objective is to provide reliable
yet not necessary profitable services for both urban commuters
and intercity travelers. Meanwhile, there are many types of
coalitions among transport carriers. For example, airlines
could form alliances through merging or stock exchange,
parallel or complementary code-sharing. Because our case
study is built upon Taiwan’s domestic market, we would be
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focused on parallel code-sharing as the form of airline coalitions.

II. MODEL FORMULATION
To model the competition among various airlines under
hub-and-spoke network, Hansen [4] had done one of the pioneer works to apply non-cooperative game approach to solve
the optimal airfares and flight frequency for airlines. Since
then, airline preferred to form alliances, i.e., to play cooperative games, to enhance market shares and to reduce costs. As a
result, we adopt cooperative game methods to deal with airline
coalitions. On the other hand, domestic transport carriers still
play non-cooperative game in the market competition. To
analyze modal competition, we apply the concept of Nash
equilibrium to deal with the profit maximization problem
using decision variables such as fare rates and frequency for
all competitors. As for cooperative games, we adopt Shapley
value as our solution approach. The solution concept of
Shapley value is to allocate profits based on the proportions of
contributions derived from all allied members. Unlike other
cooperative game approaches, Shapley value almost guarantees to have solutions if we add some appropriate assumptions.
To begin with our analysis, we adopt the following assumptions based on the nature of the market:
1) All coalitions satisfy the super-additive property;
2) All competitors have perfect information regarding costs
and revenues of the others,
3) Fare rates of all competitors are subject to upper-bound
constraints designed to maximize social welfare;
4) All competitors are looking for profit maximization under
the pricing constraints of upper-bound fare rates,
5) All competitors, except railways, would reschedule their
headways according to their design load factors.
The first assumption means that the total payoffs for any
coalition should always increase if a new player joins the
coalition. This assumption is reasonable if the action of
alliance reduces average costs and increases market shares.
The second assumption states the fact that information regarding costs and demands is often well known in transportation industry. The third and the fourth assumes that in the
short run, the objective of each competitor is to look for the
best strategy that yields the maximum profits under pricing
restrictions. The last assumption addresses the need for
rescheduling if actual load factors considerably exceed or fall
below the design load factors, which are estimated percentiles based upon the average operating costs and fare rates.
And the reason for the exclusion of railway has been stated in
the background section. These pricing restrictions are set to
maximize social welfare by the transportation authority.
Table 1 is the list of all sets, functions, variables, parameters,
and their descriptions.
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Table 1. List of sets, functions, variables, and parameters.
Symbol
Description
Sets/Subsets
A
The set of all transport carriers of an O-D pair
Ad
The set of all transport carriers in cluster d
The set of all carriers of mode m in cluster d
Adm
D
The set of all clusters in the market
M
The set of all modes
N
The set of all players in the cooperative game
S
The subset of players in the cooperative game
Functions
CS
The consumer surplus of the transport market
Q
The travel demand in the market
q
The predicted daily revenue passengers
R
The market share of a transport carrier
Round
The function of rounded integers
SW
The social welfare of the transport market
V
The utility function of a transport carrier
L
The natural log value of the objective function
π
The payoff function of a transport carrier
Variables (in Vectors or Matrices)
F
The daily service frequency
P, P
The vectors of fare rates and their upper bounds
P0
The vector of initial fare rates
The fare rate and its upper bound
P, P
s
The slack variables in the pricing constraints
Z
The matrix of other attributes of utility function
Parameters/Labels (in Vector or Matrix)
a
The average direct operating costs per flight/bus
b
The average service cost per passenger
c
The average daily operating costs per passenger
DOC
The average daily operating costs
d
The label of a cluster with related modes
k
The label for a transport carrier
The design load factor
L̂

m
Seat
WP
α

β

The label of a transport mode
The average number of seats per flight/bus
The maximal willingness to pay by passengers
The vector of parameters for other attributes in the
utility function
The parameter of fare rate in the utility function

To calibrate model parameters, it is necessary to combine
both SP and RP data using combined estimation techniques
derived by Morikawa [7] because SP data often lead to significant estimation of model parameters while RP data are
more reliable for interpretation of consumer behavior. Our
model calibration is completed in two steps: 1) the market
demand for an O-D pair, Q, is calibrated by using historical
demand data with exogenous socio-economic variables, i.e.,
economic growth rate, GDP, etc; 2) the market share model,
formulated as a nested multinomial model as shown in (1) to
(6), is calibrated by using SP and RP data. Equations (1)
through (3) represent the utility function of a transport carrier
in the nested structure. Attributes other than fare rates in these
equations include headway, travel time, and the service quality
of each transport carrier.
Equations (4) through (6) formulate the market shares which
are calibrated as a nested multinomial Logit (NMNL) model, a
modified version of the multinomial Logit (MNL) model
developed by Ben-Akiva and Lerman [1]. The choice between
MNL and NMNL is determined by the Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives Test (IIA Test). If the IIA test failed, a
NMNL model would replace a MNL model. The structure of
our nested Logit consists of three levels: the upper level includes the clusters of highly correlated modes, the middle
level consists of the modes of these clusters, and the lower
level includes the carriers of the same mode. The travel demand of transport carrier k is formulated as a product of OD
demand and market share as shown in (7). The relationship
among the sets of carriers is shown in (8). All these sets in (8)
are mutually exclusive.
Vdmk = Z dmk α dm + β dm Pdmk

(1)

∑V

(2)

Vdm = Z dm α d + γ d ln

dmk

k ∈ Adm

Md

Vd = Z d α + γ ln ∑ Vdm

(3)

m =1

Vdmk

Rdmk = Rdm × e

K dm

∑e

(4)

Vdmk

k =1

1. Market Shares and Predicted Daily Revenue Passengers
of all Competitors
Instead of applying aggregate models, we adopt the discrete
choice model to estimate the payoffs of all competitors based
on two reasons: 1) the stated preference (SP) data which contain passenger’s preferences on choices of future trips with the
inclusion of a new mode are valuable to assess the behavior of
travelers; 2) the model has an advantage of combining both the
revealed preference (RP) data and the SP data. The RP data
refer to the choices of carriers without the new mode.

Vdm
Rdm = Rd × e

Md

∑e

(5)

Vdm

m =1

Vd
Rd = e

D

∑e

(6)

Vd

d =1

qdmk = Q × Rdmk

(7)
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D

A = ∪ Ad ,
d =1

Md

Ad = ∪ Adm

(8)

m =1

2. Cost Functions of all Competitors
The daily operating cost of a transport carrier formulated as
(9) includes the indirect cost, namely the passenger service
cost, and the direct operation costs which consist of fuel cost,
labor cost, maintenance cost, salvage cost, airport cost, and
capital cost. For scheduling purpose, the frequency in (9)
could be rewritten as (10) to estimate the required number of
daily service frequency. According to previous empirical
experience, the design load factors often lie between 60% and
70% for domestic airlines, 70%~80% for freeway and bus. As
for railway, there is no design load factor to be used in the
study because the scheduling of railway operations is usually
unrestricted by design load factor.
DOCdmk = admk × Fdmk + bdmk × qdmk

(9)

q
 
Fdmk = Round  dmk
Seatdmk × Ldmk 


(10)

various competition scenarios. The survey is conducted by
general stratified sampling, i.e., the sample should be drawn in
proportion to the market shares. Calibration procedures for
deriving these load factors are as follows: 1) calibrating the
average load factor for transport carrier k of mode m from O-D
pair (i, j) by using historical load factor data, and estimating
the total daily revenue passengers for this O-D pair as shown
in Eq. (1); and 2) calibrating the market shares for all carriers
by using the combined estimation of RP and SP data. The
market share model includes all the attributes related to the
quality of services and fare rates. The functional form of the
utility function is usually assumed to be linear. In addition,
alternative-specific constants are often specified in the utility
function to reveal qualitative characteristics of the services
provided by the carriers.
2. Solution Approach of Nash Equilibrium
The solution of Nash Equilibrium is adopted from the study
by Shyr and Kuo [10] and derived from the following procedures: 1) finding the upper bound fare rates that satisfy
maximum social welfare shown in (13); and 2) solving the
system of maximization problems for all competitors as shown
in (14). Equation (13) is the formulation defined by the third
assumption while (14) is defined by the fourth assumption.

3. Payoff Functions of all Competitors
By the substitution of (7), (9) and (10), we formulated the
payoff function as shown in (11) which consists of the estimated daily profits and the daily operation costs associated
with the carrier k. If the daily frequency exceed 20 or the
weekly flights are over 100, then for scheduling purpose, Eq.
(11) could be approximated as (12) with a relatively small
margin of error.

π dmk = ( Pdmk − bdmk ) × Q × Rdmk − admk
 Q × Rdmk 
× Round 
 
 Seatdmk × Ldmk 

π dmk ≅ ( Pdmk − bdmk −

admk
 ) × Q × Rdmk
Seatdmk × Ldmk

(11)

(12)

= ( Pdmk − cdmk ) × Q × Rdmk

D Md

max ∑∑
P

∑π

dmk

(P) + CSdmk (P),

d =1 m =1 k ∈ Adm

CSdmk (P ) = ∫

WPdmk
Pdmk

qdmk (P )dPdmk

Subject to Pdmk ≥ 0, ∀k , ∀m, ∀d
max π dmk (P), subject to 0 ≤ Pdmk ≤ Pdmk , ∀k , ∀m, ∀d

1. Model Calibration

The calibration begins with the questionnaire survey on
travelers’ preference on choices of transport carriers under

(13)
(14)

P

Both (13) and (14) require techniques of non-linear optimization and their first order conditions, as shown in (15) and
(16), may have multiple solutions.
∂
∂Pdmk

D Md

∑∑ ∑ π
d =1 m =1 k ∈ Adm

dmk

(P) + CSdmk (P)  = 0, ∀k , ∀m, ∀d

III. SOLUTION APPROACH
The solution approach consists of four steps: 1) calibrating
market share models; 2) estimating payoffs for various carriers;
and 3) solving optimal fare rates and daily service frequency
under Nash equilibrium; and 4) solving profit distribution
problem by using Shapley values.
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(15)
∂π dmk
= 0, Pdmk + sdmk = Pdmk , sdmk ≥ 0, ∀k , ∀m, ∀d
∂Pdmk

(16)

However, empirical study by Shyr and Chang [9] suggested
that the profit functions shown in (13) and (14) have unique
solutions, as shown in Appendix. In addition, the functional
form of consumer’s surplus (CS) is quite similar to the form of
profit functions, i.e., a logistic-form demand function multi-
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plied by airfare. As a result, we assume that CS would have
unique solution as well. Next, we solve (15) by applying
functions to solve system of nonlinear equations in
MATHEMATICA [12]. And finally, we apply the same approach to solve (16) and check if our solutions are bounded
with the upper-bound constraints. It is often the case that the
optimal fare rates solved by (16) are bounded by upper-bounds
solved by (15). This is because the optimal solution Pa* of CS
would not be higher than the optimal solution Pc* of supplier’s
profits π due to the fact that the lower the optimal prices, the
higher the CS; on the contrary, the higher the optimal prices,
the higher the π. As a result, the optimal solution Pb* of π +
CS, as shown in Fig. 1, would be lower than Pc* . In summary, we have the relationship of these optimal solutions
as Pa* ≤ Pb* ≤ Pc* .
Another alternative to solve (13) and (14) is to apply the
first order Taylor series to the predicted daily revenuepassengers q as shown in (17) such that the objective functions
in (13) and (14) can be approximated as quadratic functions of
fare rates and (15) and (16) can be transformed into systems of
linear equations. In the case study, we use the fare rates in
2006 for all competing carriers as the vector of P0 applied to
(17).

∂q (P)
qdmk (P) ≅ qdmk (P0 ) + (P − P0 ) ' dmk
|P = P0
∂P

(17)

3. Solution Approach of Cooperative Games
To evaluate the contributions of allied members in the cooperative games, we propose the following procedures based
on the concept described by Owen [8] and Curiel [3].
Step 1: List all coalition structures.
A coalition structure is defined as a partition of all players
in the cooperative game. For example, if five airlines are
forming various alliances, their coalition structures will be S =
{1} versus N-S = {2, 3, 4, 5}, S = {3, 4} versus N-S = {1, 2, 5},
etc. As a result, there will be 2N-1 coalition structures.

f(P)
π + CS
π
CS

P *a P *b P *c

P

Fig. 1. Optimal Solutions to CS, π + CS, and π, respectively.

systems of equations yields the maximum profit and the
optimal fare rates to each coalition structure under market
equilibrium, as shown in (18). The same approach was also
adopted by Shyr and Kuo [10].

 ∂π S

 ∂F = 0 


S

 ∀S ⊂ N
π
∂
 N − S = 0
 ∂FN − S


(18)

Similarly, Eq. (18) could be solved by the technique of
Taylor series approximation.
Step 4: Apply software MATHEMATICA to solve the Shapley
value.
Given the payoffs derived from Step 3, we could apply
MATHEMATICA to compute the Shapley value and solve the
profit distribution problem in the case study.

IV. CASE STUDY

Step 2: Calibrate the payoff functions of all coalition structures.
The payoff functions are calibrated by using the same
model as in the non-cooperative game, but the data is collected
from travelers’ stated preference regarding their new choices
of carriers if new alliances among airlines were developed.

Our case study is based on the survey data collected from
the travelers between Taipei and Kaohsiung in 2005. The
players of the game include five modes, i.e., automobiles,
THSR, TR, freeway buses, and airlines. The surveys were
conducted at the boarding lounges at Taipei airport, the Taipei
Station of Taiwan Railway and Freeway Buses, and the major
service areas along the Freeways. We assume freeway buses
also form coalitions in competition with THSR, but we do not
analyze their coalitions in the paper. A study by Shyr and
Shieh [11] adopts the same approach to analyze coalitions of
freeway buses in their case study for the Taipei-Taichung
intercity travel market.

Step 3: Solve the market equilibrium under all coalition
structures.
Based on the assumption of efficiency, i.e., if a coalition S
were formed, then the others would be forced to form another
coalition N-S to compete with it, a solution of the following

1. Model Calibration Results
Table 2 shows the calibration results for the market share
model with the combination of SP and RP data as a nested
Logit model. In Table 2, Constant IV means the logarithm of
the sum of utility function within the same cluster. Since the
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Table 2. Calibrated parameters of the nested modal choice
models (t values in parentheses).
Lower Level
Models Multinomial
High-Fare Low-Fare
Logit
Variables
Modes
Modes
Constant: Air
0.043
-1.222
NA
(RP)
(1.507)
(-0.848)
Constant: Air
-1.337
NA
NA
(SP)
(-1.753)
1.113
Constant: TR
0.08
NA
(4.994)
(RP)
(4.779)
Constant: TR
0.891
NA
NA
(SP)
(3.395)
Constant: Bus
0.556
1.372
NA
(RP)
(4.758)
(7.188)
1.885
Constant: Bus
NA
NA
(6.925)
(SP)
Constant:
NA
NA
NA
Hi-fare
Constant: IV

NA

NA

NA

Table 3. Model validation of the revealed preference data.
Market Share
Sample
Chi-Square
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Air
37.9%
37.2%
145
142
0.061
TR
12.0%
14.9%
46
57
2.840
Bus
29.0%
28.0%
111
107
0.108
Auto
21.1%
19.8%
81
76
0.308
Total
100.0%
100.0%
383
383
3.316
Note: the critical value of the chi-square test at 95% confident level is
7.815.
Mode

Upper
Level
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
-0.007
(-1.939)
0.400
(6.984)

Fare Rate
(1000 NTD)
Headway
(10 min.)
Travel Time
(100 min.)
L(β)

-0.253
(-0.396)
-0.118
(-5.379)
-0.507
(-2.150)
-539.56

-0.54
(-0.644)
-0.3651
(-5.030)
-0.176
(-0.805)
-365.68

-1.45
(-4.823)
-0.226
(-6.311)
-0.103
(-4.217)
-758.5

-1035.1

L(0)

-606.34

-547.59

-814.07

-1261.2

ρ2

0.110

0.33

0.06

0.18

% Correct
Prediction

52.083

77%

53%

59%

No. of Sample

384

790

741

1531

NA

Table 4. Estimated operation costs of the Taipei-Kaohsiung
air travel market (in NTD).
Types of Seats/ Daily

NA

2006

Average

Average

Operation Operation

Load
Airfares
Costs Per Costs Per
Factors (Full-Price)
Flight Passenger

MD-83

172

5

62.5%

TNA

B757
A-321

207
194

12
5

62.5%
54.9%

UNA

MD-90

155

15

108

16

FAT

230,000

2,140

2,020

270,000
260,000

2,087
2,441

62.9%

2,122

200,000

2,051

73.5%

2,109

160,000

2,016

2,124

Note: NTD, New Taiwan Dollar, 1 USD = 32 NTD.

NA

travelers think that taking THSR is much safer than flying.
Also, travelers prefer freeway buses and railways, which are
considered to be a more comfortable way of travel as it takes
about 5 hours to drive from Taipei to Kaohsiung.
Because the cost data are very confidential in the business,
we do not have the cost data from Taiwan Railway and THSR.
In other words, we have no information regarding the operating cost per train for THSR and TR. As a result, we could
only estimate the changes of revenues before and after the
operations of THSR based on the current schedules of these
two carriers. For airlines and bus, we adopt the data published
by the Bureau of Civil Aviation and the data provided by the
Union of Freeway Buses to estimate the average daily operation costs per flight and per bus. To verify the market share
models, we present Table 3 to show the validation of the model
with RP data by a Chi-square test. The results indicate that the
differences between the observed and the predicted market
shares are insignificant.
Table 4 show the estimated costs per flight for four airlines, i.e.,
Far Eastern Air Transport (FAT), Trans Asia Airways (TNA),
UNI Air† (UNA), and Mandarin Airlines‡ (MDA) with the
flight distance of 207.5 miles between Taipei and Kaohsiung.
From Table 4, we learn that domestic airlines have little room
for profitability in the competitive market.

The airline was merged by EVA Air in 1995 and was renamed as UNI Air since 1996.
The airline is wholly owned by China Airlines since 1992 as the other partner pulled out their investment.

‡

2004

Aircraft Flight Flights

Airline

MDA B737-800

parameter of the constant rejects the null hypothesis H0: β IV =
1, we could conclude that the NMNL would be a better specification than MNL. Based on the IIA tests and model specification tests, our study suggest that the best nested structures
would be airlines and THSR in the “high-fare” cluster with
freeway buses, TR, and automobiles in the “low-fare” cluster.
The signs of the estimated parameters for fare rate, frequency,
and travel time are all negative, which is consistent with the
fact that lower utility often resulted from higher fare rates,
longer headways or travel time. The alternative-specific constants shown in Table 2 indicate that passengers would prefer
to travel by THSR rather than by airlines. In addition, freeway
buses and railway are more favorable alternatives than driving
private cars. The results are consistent with the fact that

†
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Table 5. Service attributes and fare rates of all modes
before and after THSR’s Operations.

Table 6. Modal comparison (a) - fare rates, market shares,
daily passengers, and load factors.

Scenario Headway (min)
Access Fare Rate (NTD)
Travel
Time to
Time
2006
Upper
CBD
Before After (min)
Bound
Modes
(min) Price
Air
15
30
75
15
2110
2250
THSR
NA
50
90
15
1490
1510
TR
45
45
270
0
850
850
Bus
25
25
300
0
575
610*
Auto
0
0
300
0
910
910**
* Our predicted upper bound for bus fare is much higher than 610
NTD. However, bus fares are strictly regulated by the transport
authority. As a result, we modify our upper bound to be within
10% margin.
** The costs of driving which include gasoline cost and freeway tolls
are assumed to be shared by two persons.

Scenario Fare Rates
Modes
before after

2. Solutions of Nash Equilibrium
To solve the Nash Equilibrium in (14), we need information regarding the upper bound of fare rates. Based on (13),
we predict that the reasonable margins between the 2006 fare
rates and their pricing upper bounds should be within 10% as
shown in Table 5. The data provided by Table 5 are used to
solve the Nash Equilibrium to produce Table 6 which highlights the optimal fare rates, market shares, load factors, payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfares prior to and after
the operations of THSR in the first year. By comparing Table
5 and 6, we find that the optimal fare rates of all carriers are
bounded by their upper bound constraints. If these constraints
were lifted, the optimal fare rates should be higher than their
upper bounds. In other words, the optimal fare rates derived
from the profit maximization of all competitors should be
higher than the ones derived from the maximization of social
welfare.
From Tables 6, we also learn that the operations of THSR
may have minor impacts on railway and freeway buses in the
first year. On the other hand, airlines would probably lose half
of their daily revenue passengers. To maintain profitability,
airlines would have to unify as an alliance and cut their daily
flights by 50%. In addition, our estimation suggests that if
THSR sets its fare at 1510 NTD, airlines and freeway may
have room for raising their fare rates by 6% to increase their
revenues. The reason why they are still attractive to travelers
even if they raise their fares is that THSR could operate at 19
trains per day in the first year, only one third of the fully capacity in the future, and the fare of THSR is 16% higher than
the rate announced in early 2006. In other words, if THSR do
not increase their daily operating frequency soon after the first
year of operations, airlines as well as freeway buses may have
good chances to remain profitable.

Air
THSR
TR
Bus
Auto
Total

2,110
NA
850
575
910

2,250
1,510
850
610
910

Frequency

Market Shares
before

after

before

after

37.1%
NA
14.9%
28.1%
19.9%
100%

18.4%
30.3%
13.8%
29.1%
8.4%
100%

53
NA
16
216
NA

27
23
16
216
NA

Table 6. Modal comparison (b) - daily passengers and load
factors.
Passengers

Scenario
Modes
Air
THSR
TR
Bus
Auto
Total

Load Factors

before

after

before

after

5357
NA
2155
4042
2860
14414

2649
4367
1985
4200
1213
14414

64.0%
NA
90.5%
78.0%
NA

63.6%
75.9%
83.4%
81.0%
NA

Table 6. Modal comparison (c) - payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfares (in $1,000 NTD).
Scenario

Modes
Air
THSR
TR
Bus
Auto
Total

Payoffs

Consumer Surplus Social Welfares

before

after

before

after

51
NA
1,831
$308
NA
2,191

338
6,593
1,686
$462
NA
9,079

17,597 8,827
NA
13,965
2,003 1,859
4,038 4,090
NA
NA
23,639 28,741

before

after

17,649 9,165
NA
20,558
3,834 3,545
4,347 4,552
NA
NA
25,830 37,820

3. Solutions of Profit Distribution Among Airlines by
Cooperative Games
To evaluate the contribution of all airlines in various coalition scenarios, we present Table 7 to show the coalitional
payoffs and the optimal airfares derived from (18). The estimated payoffs are derived from a different set of the SP demand data that contain only the survey of air traveler’s choices
on various airline coalitions. The data were then used to estimate the market shares and the payoffs of various airline
coalitions. From Table 7 we learn that if airline still compete
with each other in pricing, they would not be profitable in most
cases. In other words, the best strategy would be forming a
unified alliance to prevent pricing competition among them so
as to increase total revenues for the air travel market.

Oliver F.-Y. Shyr and M.-F. Hung: Intermodal Competition with High Speed Rail-A Game Theory Approach

Table 7. Airlines’ coalitional payoffs and optimal airfares
in cooperative games.
Coalitions
(Ti)
FAT, TNA
UNA, MDA
FAT, UNA
TNA, MDA
FAT, MDA
TNA, UNA
FAT
UNA, TNA,
MDA
TNA
FAT, UNA,
MDA
UNA
TNA, FAT,
MDA
MDA
TNA, FAT,
UNA

Optimal Daily
Payoffs
Airfare Revenue
(NTD/Day)
(NTD) Passengers
-1,877,384 1,473
3,247
-922,063 1,528
3,945
-1,530,036 1,440
5,264
-2,154,362 1,312
1,788
-1,864,602 1,422
4,708
-2,419,376 1,236
2,128

Load
Flights/Day
Factors
0.7526
0.9733
0.9285
0.6627
0.9283
0.6459

22
31
32
21
33
20

-1,710,850

1,196

3,051

0.9124

17

-3,303,884

1,719

2,877

0.5728

36

152,095

1,583

917

0.9457

5

-1,125,336

2,021

5,534

0.7482

48

-885,408

1,336

2,144

0.9222

15

-3,062,364

1,863

3,649

0.6039

38

-1,199,697

1,262

1,585

0.9173

16

-3,431,767

1,786

3,907

0.5885
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Table 8. Comparison of airline’s Shapley values and daily
flights.
Scenario

Shapley Values
Before

After

FAT

$12,440

$72,330

TNA
UNA
MDA
Total

$2,920
$17,240
$18,570
$51,170

$8,450
$127,770
$129,450
$338,000

Airlines

Daily Flights
Before

After

5 (MD-83)
12 (B757)
5
15
16
53

5 (MD-83)
3 (B757)
3
8
8
27

As for the distribution of profits among airlines, Table 8
shows the solutions derived from the application of Shapley
values and the information provided from Tables 6 and 7.
From Table 8, we learn that airlines with higher flight frequency and lower operating costs would be more competitive
than their partners with lower flight frequency and higher
operating cost. For example, airlines such as MDA and UNA
are much more powerful in bargaining games. As a result,
they would gain more profits than their partners.

V. CONCLUSION
The All in all, we summarize our contributions as follows:
• Given the solution approach, we provides useful insights
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for the decision markers in the market to set up their optimal fare rates and frequency that yield maximum profits for
all carriers under the assumption of efficiency and market
equilibrium.
• By integrating modal choices in our model, we could evaluate the impacts of THSR on other intercity modes of transport under competition environment. In addition, by taking
account of the modal interactions into our framework, we
are able to propose new price regulations under new service
frequency based on social welfare.
• We formulate our objective functions as a maximization
problem of social welfare to determine the upper bounds of
fare rate restriction. And we apply Nash equilibrium to
evaluate the impacts of THSR’s operation on the other
competing modes and solve their optimal fare rates in the
system of maximization problems of their profits. We also
show that the optimal fare rates solved by the maximization
of carrier’s profit function would be bounded by the upper
bound solved by the maximization of social welfare. These
upper bounds should be used as guidance for policy makers
of the transport authority in their fare rate regulation practices because they are calculated base on new market equilibrium. And most importantly, the adoption of these new
calculation rules regarding prices and service frequency can
be justified by the greater good of our society.
• We learn that the operations of THSR may have significant
impacts on railway and freeway buses. Yet, the impacts of
THSR on railway and freeway buses have not fully revealed until the first quarter of 2008 when THSR increases
its service frequency to more than 100 daily trains and
provides free shuttle bus services. On the other hand, more
than half of the daily revenue passengers from airlines have
been transferred to THSR in the first year of operations as
predicted by our model. We believe that the impacts of
THSR on railway and freeway buses could also be predicted by the use of our model.
Additional findings in our case study are summarized as
below:
• The estimated model parameters are consistent with our a
priori assumption, i.e., market shares decrease as fare rates
increase, and shorter headways lead to higher utility.
• The estimated payoffs for various coalitions support the
super-additive property in the cooperative games. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with our a priori, i.e., the
optimal airfares would increase as the market concentration
ratio rises.
• By applying Shapley value to solve the payoff distribution
among airlines, we find that airlines with more daily flights
and lower operating costs would be more competitive and
more powerful in bargaining with their partners. In other
words, they would suffer less loss or gain more profits than
their partners.
• Both airlines and freeway may have room for raising their
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Daily Profits in 10,000 NTD

CAL’s Daily Profit Function
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Fig. 2. Estimated China Airline’s daily profit function of passenger flights - Taipei to San Francisco in 2001.

fare rates to increase revenues because THSR could operate
at 23 trains per day in the first year, only one third of the
fully capacity in the future, and the fare of THSR is 16%
higher than the rate announced in 2006. However, to
maintain profitability, airlines would have to unify as an
alliance and cut their daily flights by 50%. Since the services provided by airlines could be easily replaced by
THSR as predicted by our model, the future of airlines in
the domestic market would rely on the mercy of THSR. In
other words, if THSR continue to increase its service frequency and lower its promotion prices, then the chances for
airlines to be able to compete with THSR are very slim.
Meanwhile, we have the following suggestions for future
research directions:
• A comprehensive survey of the cost data for major competing modes in domestic markets, especially THSR and
railways, and the cost reduction due to alliances, are required for a better presentation of payoff functions.
• Strategic planning regarding the scheduling problems
should be integrated into our model. Empirical studies suggest that travelers care about the schedule no less than fare
rates in choosing their modes of travel. Therefore, a more
comprehensive framework should include the scheduling
plans for all competing modes.
• A before-and-after analysis regarding the travel demand of
THSR should be examined in the near future to validate all
the predictions made by previous works. By comparing the
predicted and the revealed patronages, we can learn the
lessons from the good and the bad predictions. Eventually,
these lessons will help us to remedy all the mistakes in future demand modeling.

APPENDIX
The profit functions in the forms of (13) and (14) have
similar shapes as shown in Fig. 2, which was reported in the
case study presented by Shyr and Chang [9]. Based on the
shape of the profit function, clearly it has a unique solution.
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